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“One does what one is; one becomes what one 
does.”
(Musil, 1930)
Imagine Bob and Rob, two members of  a work-
ing group. They created a new web page together. 
However, when Bob presents the new design, he 
does not mention Rob’s contribution and takes all 
the credit. When Rob becomes aware of  Bob’s 
behavior, he is furious, accuses Bob of  falsely tak-
ing all the credit, and demands an apology. Bob, 
however, does not show any kind of  remorse and 
is not willing to make amends. A conflict emerges 
and gradually other members of  the team become 
involved, including Tim. How does Tim react? 
How does Tim’s reaction shape his self-concept 
during the conflict? And can a focus on the self-
concept help to explain why Tim reacts the way 
he does? In this article, three empirical studies 
shed light on these questions, elucidating how 
third parties react in interpersonal conflicts fol-
lowing perceived norm violations. Combined, 
they test the idea that the moral self  is a crucial 
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concept when explaining third-party reactions in 




Perceived norm violations, like the unfair credit-
taking in the scenario described before, often lie 
at the heart of  interpersonal conflicts (Montada, 
2013). Such conflicts take place in a variety of  
groups (e.g., organizational teams, families, or 
even groups of  complete strangers), and they 
often share a common structure: in a typical 
course of  events, the victim accuses the perpetra-
tor of  having violated a norm, and demands 
some kind of  restitution or, at least, an acknowl-
edgment. This demand creates a pressure to react, 
not only for the accused perpetrator but also for 
third parties, who might consider this demand 
more or less legitimate. Thus, third parties 
become inadvertently involved in the conflict, 
and it is important to understand the psychologi-
cal processes underlying their initial reactions, as 
they can have decisive consequences for the fur-
ther course of  events (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). 
For instance, depending on third parties’ reac-
tions, Bob might get away with his bad behavior 
or might be forced to apologize and make up for 
it. If  third parties do not take action against Bob’s 
behavior or even defend Bob, Rob’s feelings of  
being mistreated may have downstream conse-
quences, such as—in the context of  the exam-
ple—counterproductive work behaviors or 
resignation intentions (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015). 
So, which processes underlie third parties’ initial 
reactions to conflicts?
Social psychological research on behavior in 
conflicts following norm violations—such as the 
one presented here—has mainly focused on the 
central protagonists’ behaviors (i.e., victim and 
transgressor; see Gray & Wegner, 2009; Shnabel & 
Nadler, 2008). Studies on third-party responses are 
comparably sparse and have mainly focused on 
specific behaviors, such as third-party punishment 
(e.g., Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & 
Fetchenhauer, 2011), retribution (e.g., Skarlicki & 
Rupp, 2010), forgiveness (e.g., Green, Burnette, & 
Davis, 2008), or compensation (e.g., Lotz, Okimoto, 
Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). What is missing, 
however, is an integrative framework linking third-
party behavior in social conflicts with the actors’ 
self-concept. The present research aims to fill this 
gap.
Social Roles
We propose that reacting to a conflict situation 
from a third-party perspective means taking a role. 
Notably, each individual who is neither victim nor 
perpetrator, such as Tim in our opening example, 
can take one (and only one) of  five roles (see 
Figure 1): “victim supporter,” “perpetrator sup-
porter,” “arbitrator,” “escalator,” and “bystander.” 
In the example of  Rob and Bob, Tim could sup-
port Rob’s claims for an apology (“victim sup-
porter”), argue in favor of  Bob’s behavior 
(“perpetrator supporter”), mediate between Rob 
and Bob (e.g., by trying to find a solution that is 
acceptable for both; “arbitrator”), escalate the con-
flict (“escalator”), or stay out of  the conflict 
(“bystander”). What would Tim do? Which role is 
he likely to take, and why? And how does this role-
taking reflect on Tim’s self-concept? 
Role-Taking and the Self
According to Gecas (1982), a role “typically refers 
to the behavioral expectations associated with a 
position or status (either formal or informal) in a 
social system” (p. 14). Behavioral expectations are 
necessarily aligned with other role-specific associa-
tions, for example, the specific goal that a role pro-
ponent is expected to pursue. A role-specific goal 
can be positively and/or negatively interdependent 
with the goals pursued by other actors (in their 
respective roles). These interdependencies form 
social systems such as societies (macro level) or 
interactions (micro level). For instance, a sale situa-
tion consists of  at least a buyer and a seller; a 
knowledge transmission situation (such as in the 
classroom) consists of  (at least) a student and a 
teacher; and a conflict situation consists of  (at least) 
a victim and a perpetrator, as described before.
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Moreover, and central to the present research, 
roles are intertwined with the self, a fact that has 
been especially highlighted by symbolic interac-
tionism (e.g., Stryker & Burke, 2000). Thus, third-
party reactions can at least partly be accounted 
for by a self-regulatory process. Firstly, taking a 
particular role should make associations between 
role-specific features and the situational self-
concept (or “working self-concept”; see Markus 
& Kunda, 1986) stronger. And secondly, because 
people differ in the degree to which they experi-
ence certain self-associations as rewarding (e.g., 
moral associations; Aquino & Reed, 2002), stable 
personality dispositions capturing such individual 
differences should predict role choice.
How Role-Taking Shapes the 
Situational Self-Concept
The situational self-concept consists of  all self-
referent cognitions and emotions in a particular 
situation referring to, for instance, self-evalua-
tions in the domains of  (a) morality (i.e., the extent 
to which one perceives her/himself  to be a moral 
person), (b) self-esteem (i.e., a general evaluation of  
oneself), (c) identity expression (i.e., the extent to 
which one’s actions express “who I am”), (d) 
meaning (i.e., the extent to which one’s actions are 
experienced as meaningful), and (e) power (i.e., the 
extent to which one’s actions provide one with a 
sense of  power). Looking at the identity expres-
sion and meaning facets allows investigating the 
degree to which third parties experience a role as 
meaningful and relate it to the self. The self-
esteem facet allows investigating which of  the 
self-domains often associated with social roles 
(i.e., power and morality) is more important for 
general self-valence in conflict situations. Power 
and morality are important domains when it 
comes to role-taking, because social roles entail 
rights and duties (Karelaia & Keck, 2013), allow-
ing powerful (i.e., when wielding rights) and 
moral experiences (i.e., when fulfilling duties). 
For instance, as a referee in a soccer match, the 
rights and duties assigned to the role allow refer-
ees to experience themselves as powerful and 
moral persons: the right to decide over what oth-
ers are allowed or not allowed to do can provide 
referees with a sense of  power, and fulfilling the 
duty to be fair and impartial can provide them 
with moral self-regard.
Indeed, a particularly relevant facet of  the 
situational self-concept—especially in conflict 
situations—is morality: the extent to which one is 
able to perceive oneself  as a moral (or immoral) 
person (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). Everything an 
actor does in a conflict following a norm violation 
has moral value, that is, can be evaluated on a moral 
dimension of  “right” and “wrong.” Thus, taking a 
moral role in a conflict allows the actor both to 
express and to experience him/herself  as a moral 
person, at least temporarily. Thus, taking a moral 
role in a conflict should be correlated with a more 
positive moral situational self-concept than taking 
a neutral or immoral role. However, a morality-
boosting effect of  moral role-taking does not 
explain why a given actor takes a given role. Why do 
some actors take moral roles more often than oth-
ers? Do some actors profit from moral role-taking 
more than others?
Individual Differences in Moral 
Role-Taking
If  the idea that social conflicts are charged with 
notions of  morality and injustice—especially 
after perceived norm violations—were true, per-
sonality traits that reflect an individual concern 
for justice should be systematically linked to role-
taking. More specifically, when third parties 
become involved in a normative conflict between 
two other actors, they take the neutral observer’s 
perspective. Consequently, a trait that should 
Figure 1. Schema of third-party conflict roles 
resulting out of activity and sidedness as classification 
dimensions. 
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shape whether or not third parties take a moral 
(vs. a nonmoral) role is people’s dispositional sen-
sitivity to injustice from an observer’s perspective 
(which is also referred to as “observer sensitivity” 
in the literature; see Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, 
& Maes, 2010; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & 
Arbach, 2005). People scoring high on observer 
sensitivity are more sensitive to cues of  observed 
injustice than people scoring low on this trait 
(Baumert, Gollwitzer, Staubach, & Schmitt, 
2011). Furthermore, they experience strong nega-
tive emotions in the face of  observed injustice, 
and they tend to ruminate longer about observed 
or alleged injustice. In line with these findings, 
observer sensitivity is related to moral behavioral 
dispositions such as modesty, agreeableness, or 
perspective-taking (Schmitt et al., 2005), coopera-
tive choices in social dilemmas (e.g., Fetchenhauer 
& Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Pfeiffer, 
& Ensenbach, 2009; Thomas, Baumert, & 
Schmitt, 2011), solidarity with the disadvantaged 
(Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 
2005), and a willingness to engage in costly sanc-
tioning of  rule-breakers (“altruistic punishment”; 
see Lotz, Baumert, et al., 2011). Thus, observer 
sensitivity is expected to positively predict the 
likelihood of  taking a moral role in social con-
flicts, that is, the arbitrator or the victim sup-
porter role.
A second personality disposition that should 
uniquely predict moral role-taking in social con-
flicts is moral identity—the centrality of  morality 
for one’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
Importantly, moral identity consists of  two dimen-
sions: moral internalization is the degree to which 
moral traits (e.g., caring, honest, and fair) are cen-
tral to one’s general self-concept. Moral symboliza-
tion is the degree to which the traits are reflected in 
one’s actions—stated differently, the degree to 
which a person wants to communicate the posses-
sion of  moral traits to others.
Regarding role choices in conflicts, people 
with a high moral identity thus should be more 
likely to prefer a moral over a nonmoral role; this 
applies both to “high internalizers” as well as to 
“high symbolizers” (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). 
However, regarding the effects of  role-taking on 
the situational self-concept, only “high internal-
izers” should actually feel more moral after taking 
a moral role because doing so provides actors 
with cues for their moral situational self-concept, 
and “high internalizers” react more readily 
towards such cues (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). 
“High symbolizers,” however, are more con-
cerned about appearing moral to others instead of  
nourishing their moral self. Thus, if  taking a 
moral role in interpersonal conflicts fosters one’s 
moral situational self-concept, it follows that 
moral internalization, but not moral symboliza-
tion, should amplify (i.e., positively moderate) 
this effect.
The Present Research
The present paper describes three studies in 
which the following hypotheses are empirically 
tested:
H1: Observer sensitivity uniquely predicts tak-
ing a moral role (i.e., above and beyond moral 
identity and more general morality-related 
personality traits). That is, the higher an actor 
scores on observer sensitivity, the higher the 
likelihood of  taking a moral, compared to a 
neutral or immoral, role.
H2: Moral internalization and symbolization 
both uniquely predict taking a moral role (i.e., 
over and above observer sensitivity and more 
general morality-related personality traits). 
The higher an actor scores on moral internali-
zation and moral symbolization, the higher the 
likelihood of  taking a moral, compared to a 
neutral or immoral, role.
H3a: Taking a moral role in a conflict elicits a 
higher moral situational self-concept during 
the conflict than taking a neutral or immoral 
role.
H3b: This effect is amplified by moral inter-
nalization but not by moral symbolization.
In Study 1, personality traits and (self-
reported) role choice in a conflict scenario were 
measured online. After taking a role in this 
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conflict, participants rated five facets of  their 
situational self-concept during the conflict (i.e., 
morality, self-esteem, identity, meaning, and 
power), with morality as the central dependent 
variable (DV). In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 
with an experimental design: instead of  measur-
ing participants’ role choice via self-reports, 
participants were randomly assigned to one par-
ticular role in a conflict. Again, the moral situ-
ational self-concept during the conflict was the 
central DV in this study. Study 3 directly builds 
upon the findings of  Study 2 and scrutinizes 




Sample. Participants were recruited via a univer-
sity-wide mailing list including students and 
university staff members. All participants com-
pleted the study online using the survey plat-
form SoSci Survey (https://www.soscisurvey.
de). As a reward, a tablet PC was raffled among 
all participants. The final sample consisted of n 
= 659 participants (65% women) between 18 
and 70 years of age (M = 29, SD = 10.4). This 
large sample size was the result of our efforts to 
ensure statistical power for each of the logistic 
regressions in the multinomial regression model 
of role choice (see the following lines): we 
aimed for at least 100 participants per role, and 
stopped data collection 1 week after this thresh-
old was reached. No analyses were conducted 
before the end of data collection. A post hoc 
power analysis for the logistic regression with 
the two roles chosen by the fewest participants 
as outcome variables (bystander and victim sup-
porter; n = 110 each) and a given odds ratio of 
2 for a continuous predictor (corresponding to 
a small to medium effect size; Chen, Cohen, & 
Chen, 2010) revealed a power of 86%. While 
the majority of the sample consisted of students 
(66%, n = 432), we also recruited a substantial 
amount of participants in their working life 
(30%, n = 197).
Independent variables
Moral identity (MI). Participants indicated their 
age and sex and then responded to the 10 items of  
the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
The MI scale measures the centrality of  a set of  
moral traits (e.g., caring, fair, helpful) to a person’s 
self-concept with two subscales. The Moral Inter-
nalization subscale measures the degree to which 
persons internalize the set of  moral traits into 
their personal self-concept (e.g., “Being someone 
who has these characteristics is an important part 
of  who I am”; five items; α = .74). The Moral 
Symbolization subscale measures the effort per-
sons spend on communicating to others that 
they have these moral traits (e.g., “I often wear 
clothes that identify me as having these charac-
teristics”; five items; α = .77). Response scales 
ranged between 1 (completely disagree) and 6 (com-
pletely agree), with higher values indicating a higher 
centrality of  morality to a person’s self-concept.
Observer sensitivity (OS). Next, participants 
completed the 10 items of  the Observer Sensi-
tivity Scale (e.g., “I am upset when someone is 
undeservingly worse off  than others”; α = .87; 
Schmitt et al., 2010; Schmitt et al., 2005). Again, 
response scales ranged between 1 and 6.
Honesty-humility and agreeableness. To enable us 
to scrutinize the hypothesized unique effects of  
moral identity and observer sensitivity on role 
choice over and above broader personality traits 
(i.e., H1 and H2), we included two traits from 
the HEXACO model of  personality (Ashton 
et al., 2004): honesty-humility (e.g., “I would 
never accept a bribe, even if  it were very large”; 
10 items; α = .67), and agreeableness (e.g., “I 
rarely hold a grudge, even against people who 
have badly wronged me”; 10 items; α = .76). 
Response scales ranged between 1 and 5.
Dependent variables
Role-taking. Participants were told to imagine 
being a member of  an organizational working 
group. They then read a short description of  a 
norm conflict evolving in this team (see Appendix 
A in the supplemental material for all vignettes). 
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Each participant read one vignette, which was 
chosen randomly out of  a set of  three vignettes, 
each containing a different kind of  norm viola-
tion (e.g., violation of  fairness norms, personal 
harm) to extend external validity. To ensure that 
the described situations were plausible, immer-
sive, and free of  undesired biases (e.g., strongly 
favoring a certain role), a set of  five vignettes 
was pretested. In a between-subjects design, 88 
participants read one of  the five vignettes and 
rated it with regard to immersion ( “I can picture 
myself  in that situation very well”), general plau-
sibility (“What happened in the described situa-
tion appears plausible to me”), plausibility of  the 
conflict (“It appears plausible to me that a con-
flict developed out of  that situation”), plausibility 
of  third-party reactions (“How plausible would 
it be for third parties in this situation to [support 
the perpetrator/support the victim/do nothing/
try to reconcile]?”), responsibility for causing 
the conflict (“Which of  the two actors caused 
the conflict?”), and severity of  the norm viola-
tion (“How much damage did [name] cause with 
his behavior?”). Two vignettes were discarded 
because of  the pretest results. One was discarded 
because the norm violation was rated as very mild 
in the pretest (M = 1.81, SD = 1.11; on a scale 
from 0 = no damage was caused by the behavior to 5 = 
a very big damage was caused by the behavior), and the 
evolving conflict did not appear very plausible to 
participants (M = 2.94, SD = 1.35; on a scale 
from 0 = not at all plausible to 5 = very plausible). 
Another vignette was discarded because the 
supposed perpetrator of  the norm violation was 
not clearly identifiable as the perpetrator (44% 
of  all participants in the pretest sample wrongly 
identified the victim as being responsible for the 
conflict).
The situation described at the end of  all three 
vignettes portrayed a team meeting in which a 
conflict between two team members is debated 
(see Appendix A in the supplemental material). 
While the perpetrator is neglecting his wrongdo-
ing, the victim wants everybody in the work 
group to recognize the wrongdoing and to sup-
port the claim for consequences for the perpetra-
tor. Next, the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
reactions from participants during that meeting 
were assessed in open format. Thus, participants 
were asked how they would feel, think, and 
behave during this conflict meeting. Participants 
were then asked to subsume their respective reac-
tion under a particular role (i.e., victim supporter, 
perpetrator supporter, bystander, or arbitrator1) 
that fitted their reaction best. The supporter roles 
were labeled as “supporter of  [name]” to avoid 
biases through the labels of  victim and perpetra-
tor. By assessing the reaction in an open format 
first, and anchoring participants’ role choice this 
way, we prevented participants from choosing 
their role based on the label. That said, some 
participants confused the names of  victim and 
perpetrator, or chose a role label which was com-
pletely incongruent with their reaction described 
beforehand (e.g., indicating “arbitrator” as a role, 
but describing their behavior as clearly sided). To 
correct for this kind of  mislabeling, two inde-
pendent raters, who were blind to the hypotheses, 
checked the congruence between reaction and 
label for all cases. Only obvious cases of  mislabe-
ling, indicated by both raters, were corrected 
(3.6% of  all cases, n = 24).2
Situational self-concept. After role-taking, partici-
pants were asked to imagine acting as described 
before (i.e., during the meeting). In other words, 
they were told to imagine themselves in their spe-
cific role in the actual conflict situation. The five 
facets of  the situational self-concept as described 
in the introduction were assessed by asking par-
ticipants how acting out their role in the conflict 
would make them think and feel about themselves 
(17 items; see Appendix B in the supplemental 
material). Items were developed in accordance 
with the definition of  a situational self-concept, 
as described before. The facet “moral situational 
self-concept” was most relevant for the present 
purposes. Since we were unable to find a suit-
able self-report measure of  the moral situational 
self-concept in the literature, we developed 
three items based on the definition given before 
(“What I said and did in the situation shows that 
I am a moral person,” “What I said and did in the 
situation shows that I am a good person,” “What 
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I said and did in the situation is an expression of  
my fundamental convictions and values”). Item- 
and scale-level analyses (including all 17 items) 
showed that these three items loaded on a com-
mon factor (with loadings ⩾ .3), which explained 
5.2% of  the observed variance (see Appendix 
B in the supplemental material). Given a suffi-
cient internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .78), 
we aggregated the three items into a Situational 
Moral Self-Concept Scale.
The other facets of  the situational self-concept 
were self-esteem (three items; α = .74; e.g., 
“Because of  the things I said and did in the situa-
tion, I am satisfied with myself ”; adapted from the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Rosenberg, 1979), 
identity (four items; α = .85; e.g., “What I said and 
did in the situation is an expression of  my person-
ality”; self-developed), meaning (two items; r = 
.74, p < .01; e.g., “What I said and did in the situa-
tion was meaningful”; self-developed), and power 
(five items; α = .83; e.g., “I think I had some 
power in the situation”; adapted from Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006). Response scales ranged between 1 
and 6. A list of  all items can also be found in 
Appendix B in the supplemental material.
Results
Correlations and descriptive statistics for all 
measured variables are reported in Table 1. To 
test Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding predictors of  
role-taking, a multinomial regression model was 
specified. The outcome was the (self-selected) 
role choice with the roles of  (a) victim supporter 
(n = 110), (b) arbitrator (n = 439), and (c) 
bystander (n = 110), with the bystander role as 
the reference category (coded with 0). The fourth 
role, perpetrator supporter, was not chosen by 
any participant. Obviously, this role was not suf-
ficiently plausible or attractive enough in the 
presently described situation. The results of  the 
multinomial regressions are reported in Table 2. 
The five predictors—observer sensitivity, moral 
internalization, moral symbolization, honesty-
humility, and agreeableness—were simultane-
ously entered into the regression model. As 
predicted, observer sensitivity (B = 0.34, p < .01) 
and moral internalization (B = 0.29, p = .02) had 
significant positive effects on the arbitrator ver-
sus bystander contrast. In other words, the higher 
a person scores on observer sensitivity or moral 
internalization, the higher the likelihood that he/
she will choose the arbitrator over the bystander 
role—above and beyond more general personal-
ity traits (honesty-humility and agreeableness) 
and moral symbolization. Moral symbolization, 
in contrast to our hypothesis, did not show the 
same predictive effect.
Regarding the victim supporter role, moral 
internalization (B = 0.36, p = .02) had a significant 
Table 1. Correlations among and descriptive statistics for all measured variables in Study 1.
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. MI: Internalization 5.16 0.69 –  
2. MI: Symbolization 3.17 0.98 .38* –  
3. Observer sensitivity 4.51 0.81 .38* .28* –  
4. Honesty-humility 3.61 0.61 .17* .11* .10* –  
5. Agreeableness 3.19 0.62 .16* .14* −.06 .14* –  
6. SSC: Self-esteem 4.60 0.88 .12* .17* .10* −.03 .05 –  
7. SSC: Meaning 3.80 1.15 .18* .21* .16* −.08 .03 .57* –  
8. SSC: Expression 4.58 0.98 .23* .18* .15* .03 .07 .34* .37* –  
9. SSC: Moral 4.21 1.03 .25* .23* .28* −.06 .09* .59* .56* .50* –  
10. SSC: Power 3.23 1.11 .08* .22* .12* −.14* −.04 .50* .62* .30* .47* –
Note. N = 659. MI = moral identity; SSC = situational self-concept. All scales ranged from 1 to 6, except for honesty-humili-
ty and agreeableness, which ranged from 1 to 5.
*p < .05.
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positive effect on the victim supporter versus 
bystander contrast. Although observer sensitivity 
had a similar effect in size on the victim supporter 
versus bystander contrast (B = 0.26) in compari-
son to its effect on the arbitrator versus bystander 
contrast (B = 0.34), this effect was not significant 
on a 5% level (p = .07). Honesty-humility had a 
significant negative effect on the victim supporter 
versus bystander contrast (B = −0.28, p = .04). 
This unexpected effect led us to test whether the 
pattern of  results would be robust if  honesty-
humility and agreeableness were excluded from the 
analysis (see Appendix B, Table 10, in the supple-
mental material). While this produced no changes 
in the pattern of  results regarding the arbitrator 
versus bystander contrast, the significance pattern 
regarding the victim supporter versus bystander 
contrast switched with regard to moral internaliza-
tion and observer sensitivity. Whereas the positive 
effect of  moral internalization was not significant 
anymore (B = 0.28, p = .05), the positive effect of  
observer sensitivity now reached significance (B = 
0.28, p = .04). Across both moral roles, the results 
show that the likelihood of  choosing a moral role 
in contrast to a bystander role increases with higher 
scores on observer sensitivity and moral internali-
zation, while the likelihood of  choosing a victim 
supporter role decreases with higher scores on 
honesty-humility.
The mean scores and standard deviations for 
the moral situational self-concept as a function 
of  role choice and the corresponding ANOVA 
results are reported in Table 3. In line with 
Hypothesis 3a, participants who took moral roles 
as an arbitrator or victim supporter profited more 
from their roles in regard to their moral situa-
tional self-concept in comparison to participants 
who took the bystander role, F(2, 656) = 69.76, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .18. That is, moral roles—in com-
parison to the bystander role—provided them 
with a stronger sense of  their moral character.
To test Hypothesis 3b regarding the amplify-
ing role of  moral internalization (but not sym-
bolization), we specified multivariate linear 
regression models with the moral situational 
self-concept as dependent variable. The results 
for the internalization model are displayed in 
Table 4. In the first step, two dummy-coded 
variables were included to contrast the effects 
of  taking the arbitrator or the victim supporter 
role (both coded 1) versus the bystander role 
(coded 0). Additionally, moral internalization 
(z-standardized to facilitate the interpretation of  
regression weights) was included as predictor. In 
Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression predicting choice of role with bystander as reference category in 
Study 1.
Model Predictor B SE p OR 95% CI
Arbitrator (Intercept) 1.47 0.12 < .01  
 Internalization 0.29 0.12 .02 1.33* [1.06, 1.67]
 Symbolization 0.10 0.12 .39 1.11 [0.87, 1.41]
 OS 0.34 0.12 < .01 1.40* [1.11, 1.76]
 HH 0.13 0.11 .26 1.14 [0.91, 1.41]
 AGR 0.07 0.12 .55 1.07 [0.86, 1.34]
VS (Intercept) 0.02 0.15 .87  
 Internalization 0.36 0.15 .02 1.43* [1.06, 1.93]
 Symbolization −0.04 0.15 .78 0.96 [0.71, 1.29]
 OS 0.26 0.15 .07 1.30 [0.98, 1.73]
 HH −0.28 0.14 .04 0.76* [0.58, 0.99]
 AGR −0.19 0.14 .19 0.83 [0.63, 1.10]
Note. N = 659. All predictors were z-standardized. VS = victim supporter; OS = observer sensitivity; HH = honesty-humili-
ty; AGR = agreeableness; CI = confidence interval for odds ratio (OR).
*p < .05.
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the second step, the interaction terms of  
Internalization × Arbitrator (vs. bystander; 
Dummy 1), and Internalization × Victim 
Supporter (vs. bystander; Dummy 2) were added 
to the model. Doing so did not decrease the 
unexplained variance significantly (∆R² < .01, 
p = .43). That is, in a quasi-experimental design 
with a self-selection to the experimental groups 
(i.e., to the roles), moral internalization (which 
was used in the same study to predict role-taking 
and is therefore confounded with the role 
choice) did not amplify the effects of  moral 
role-taking on the moral situational self- 
concept. We specified an analogous two-step 
model with moral symbolization replacing inter-
nalization, yielding the same pattern of  results 
(∆R² < .01, p = .87).3
Discussion
The results of  Study 1 support the hypotheses 
that moral internalization and observer sensitivity 
predict moral role-taking choices in interpersonal 
conflicts succeeding norm violations, but do not 
support the hypothesis that symbolization also 
predicts moral role-taking. People with a strong 
Table 3. Mean scores, standard deviations, and univariate analyses of variance for facets of the situational self-
concept as a function of role in Study 1.
Role Moral Self-esteem Power Meaning Expression
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Bystander 3.25a 1.20 3.78a 1.17 2.22a 1.01 2.70a 1.32 4.02a 1.30
Victim supporter 4.47b 0.90 4.62b 0.75 3.41b 0.99 3.93b 0.99 4.72b 0.85
Arbitrator 4.39b 0.86 4.80b 0.70 3.44b 1.02 4.04b 0.96 4.66b 0.87
ANOVA (F), ηp² (69.76*), .18 (66.04*), .17 (64.22*), .17 (72.84*), .19 (24.94*), .07
Note. N = 659. All scales range from 1 to 6. Superscript letters indicate homogeneous subgroups following the Tukey-HSD 
(honest significant difference) procedure.
*p < .001.
Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis summary for role-taking and moral internalization predicting 
participants’ moral situational self-concept in Study 1.
Step and predictor variable B SE B R² ∆R²
Step 1: .23*  
 Intercept 3.34 0.09  
 Dummy 1 (arbitrator) 1.02* 0.10  
 Dummy 2 (VS) 1.16* 0.12  
 Internalization 0.23* 0.04  
Step 2: .23* < .01
 Intercept 3.33 0.09  
 Dummy 1 (arbitrator) 1.03* 0.10  
 Dummy 2 (VS) 1.16* 0.13  
 Internalization 0.21* 0.05  
 Dummy 1 x Internalization 0.06 0.06  
 Dummy 2 x Internalization −0.06 0.10  
Note. N = 659. VS = victim supporter. Reference category for the role dummies = bystander. Internalization was  
z-standardized.
*p < .05.
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moral internalization disposition were more likely 
to take a moral role as an arbitrator or as a victim 
supporter in comparison to the bystander role—
over and above more general personality traits, 
that is, agreeableness and honesty-humility. 
People scoring high on observer sensitivity were 
more likely to take a moral role as an arbitrator in 
comparison to the bystander role in the same 
analysis. Interestingly, moral symbolization did 
not predict moral role-taking. This might be a 
result of  the fact that this was an online study: 
moral symbolization might show a predictive 
effect in settings where the presence of  others—
to whom one can communicate one’s moral traits 
through role-taking—is more salient than in an 
online imagination task.
The results also support Hypothesis 3a that 
moral role-taking elicits a moral situational self-
concept. Participants taking a moral role (i.e., 
arbitrator or victim supporter) perceived a signifi-
cantly higher moral situational self-concept dur-
ing the conflict. These effects are in line with our 
reasoning that taking moral roles in conflicts 
boosts actors’ moral situational self-concept 
more than taking neutral roles. Regarding 
Hypothesis 3b, the data from Study 1 do not sup-
port the notion that actors scoring high on moral 
internalization profit even more strongly in their 
moral situational self-concept from moral role-
taking in comparison to taking a bystander role. 
However, in the present study, the free choice of  
roles—which was necessary to test the predictive 
effects of  the traits on role-taking—only offered 
a quasi-experimental design to investigate the 
role-taking effects on the situational self-concept. 
This design is not optimal to test Hypothesis 3 (a 
and b) due to the nonindependence between 
moral internalization and role choice. To test 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b more rigidly, we conducted 
a second experimental study with a random 
assignment of  roles.
Study 2
In Study 2, we tested Hypotheses 3a and 3b in an 
experimental design. In addition, we also wanted 
to avoid a priming of  moral idealism through the 
assessment of  moral identity directly prior to 
role-taking. Therefore, we assessed moral identity 
independently at a measurement occasion 4 
months prior to the actual study.
Sample
Participants were first-year psychology students. 
In the first week of  the semester, they completed 
a battery of  paper-and-pencil questionnaires that, 
among other trait scales, also included the same 
observer sensitivity and moral identity scales that 
had been used in Study 1 (five items for moral 
internalization, α = .78; five items for moral sym-
bolization, α = .78). Four months later, students 
were invited to take part in an online study on 
“behavior in conflict situations.” Seventy-two stu-
dents completed the online study, and 55 (i.e., 
76%) of  them could be unambiguously matched 
with their data from the questionnaire battery on 
the basis of  a personalized code. This was a con-
venience sample, as we tried to recruit as many 
participants from that year as possible. Data col-
lection was stopped at the end of  the semester. 
No analyses were conducted before the end of  
data collection. A post hoc power analysis in 
regard to an increase in coefficient of  determina-
tion corresponding to a medium-sized effect of  
the proposed interaction in Hypothesis 3b (f² = 
.15) yielded a power of  70%.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were the same as in 
Study 1, except that (a) no traits were assessed 
directly prior to reading the vignettes, and (b) 
roles in the conflict situation (victim supporter, 
arbitrator, bystander) were randomly assigned 
instead of  chosen. Furthermore, to avoid biases 
created by the role labels, a schematic depiction 
was used to assign the roles (see Figure 2). As a 
manipulation check, participants were asked how 
they would behave when taking their respective 
role in the conflict, and answers were probed 
with regard to their role consistency by two inde-
pendent raters (e.g., no active behavior as a 
bystander, no side-taking by arbitrators, active 
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support of  the victim as a victim supporter). 
Participants would have been excluded if  both 
raters indicated role-inconsistent behavior. 
However, no data had to be excluded on the basis 
of  this rule. Afterwards, like in Study 1, the same 
self-referent cognitions and emotions during the 
conflict session were assessed (all Cronbach’s 
α > .75).
Results
Correlations and descriptive statistics can be 
found in Appendix C in the supplemental mate-
rial. The results for Hypothesis 3a stating that 
moral role-taking is associated with a higher moral 
situational self-concept than taking a bystander 
role are displayed in Table 5. The results replicate 
the effect from Study 1: participants who were 
assigned to a moral role (arbitrator or victim sup-
porter) reported a significantly higher moral situ-
ational self-concept during the conflict meeting 
than proponents of  the bystander role, F(2, 52) = 
4.50, p = .02, ηp2 = .15.
To test Hypothesis 3b stating that this effect is 
amplified by moral internalization, but not by 
moral symbolization, we specified multivariate 
linear regression models with the moral situa-
tional self-concept as dependent variable. The 
results for the model with internalization as mod-
erator are displayed in Table 6. In the first step, 
two dummy-coded variables were included to 
contrast the effects of  taking the arbitrator or the 
victim supporter role (both coded 1) versus the 
bystander role (coded 0). Additionally, moral 
internalization (z-standardized) was included as 
predictor. In the second model, the two interac-
tion terms were added to the model. Doing so 
decreased the unexplained variance significantly 
(∆R² = .13, p = .02), supporting the hypothesis 
that moral internalization amplifies the effects of  
moral role-taking on the moral situational self-
concept. For people scoring high on internaliza-
tion (+1 SD), moral role-taking as an arbitrator in 
comparison to taking a bystander role had a sig-
nificant positive effect on the predicted moral 
situational self-concept (B = 0.88, p < .01), as 
well as moral role-taking as victim supporter (B = 
1.22, p < .01). In contrast, for people low on 
internalization (−1 SD), taking the arbitrator role 
(B = 0.67, p = .02) still led to a significant increase 
in the predicted moral situational self-concept, 
Figure 2. Schema used for the role assignment of 
bystander (1), victim supporter (4), and arbitrator (3) 
in Study 2.
Table 5. Mean scores, standard deviations, and univariate analyses of variance for facets of the situational self-
concept as a function of role in Study 2.
Role Moral Self-esteem Power Meaning Expression
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Bystander 3.67a 1.09 4.13a 1.05 3.11a 1.30 3.57a 1.31 3.92a 1.31
Victim supporter 4.42b 0.90 5.02b 0.60 3.95b 0.72 4.40b 0.57 4.77b 1.02
Arbitrator 4.42b 0.65 5.09b 0.74 3.67b 0.92 4.76b 0.79 4.79b 0.71
ANOVA (F), ηp² (4.50*), .15 (7.98*), .24 (3.21*), .11 (7.77*), .23 (4.83*), .15
Note. N = 55. All scales range from 1 to 6. Superscript letters indicate homogeneous subgroups following the Tukey-HSD 
(honest significant difference) procedure.
*p < .05.
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while taking the victim supporter role (B = 0.34, 
p = .12) did not. The interaction is graphically dis-
played in Figure 3. Note that the Internalization 
× Arbitrator interaction coefficient in Table 6 is 
not significant according to conventional levels 
(p = .11). However, the pattern of  the interaction 
and the simple effects support the notion that 
internalization moderates role-taking effects on 
the moral situational self-concept. We ran an 
analogous model for moral symbolization (see 
Appendix C, Table 12, in the supplemental mate-
rial). Although a similar pattern resulted, using 
symbolization as a moderator of  role-taking 
effects did not decrease the unexplained variance 
significantly (∆R² = .05, p = .21). This lends sup-
port to our hypothesis that moral internalization, 
but not moral symbolization, amplifies the posi-
tive effect of  moral role-taking on the moral situ-
ational self-concept.4
Discussion
The results of  Study 2 further support the 
hypothesis that moral role-taking in norm con-
flicts reflects positively on the moral situational 
self-concept, and that people with a high moral 
internalization profit even more from the benefi-
cial effect of  moral role-taking. The latter effect 
supports the proposed motivational mechanism: 
people who have strongly internalized moral 
aspects into their personal self-concept are drawn 
towards roles that elicit a moral situational self-
concept because they feel even more moral in 
moral roles than people who do not value the 
moral aspect of  their self  as highly. In this sense, 
Study 2 sheds light on how stable features of  
one’s self-concept (e.g., a high centrality of  moral 
aspects for the general self) interact with situa-
tional factors (e.g., moral role-taking in conflicts) 
on the moral situational self-concept. However, 
the design of  Study 2—a clear-cut norm violation 
as the starting point of  the conflict, a work group 
Table 6. Hierarchical regression analysis summary for role-taking and moral internalization predicting 
participants’ moral situational self-concept in Study 2.
Step and predictor variable B SE B R² ∆R²
Step 1: .16*  
 Intercept 3.67 0.20  
 Dummy 1 (arbitrator) 0.74* 0.29  
 Dummy 2 (VS) 0.75* 0.31  
 Internalization 0.09 0.12  
Step 2: .29* .13*
 Dummy 1 (arbitrator) 0.78* 0.27  
 Dummy 2 (VS) 0.78* 0.29  
 Internalization –0.39 0.21  
 Dummy 1 x Internalization 0.49 0.30  
 Dummy 2 x Internalization 0.82* 0.28  
Note. N = 55. VS = victim supporter. Reference category for the role dummies = bystander. Internalization was z-standardized.
*p < .05.
Figure 3. Relationships between moral 
internalization and the moral situational self-concept 
in Study 2 for each role.
SSC = situational self-concept.
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context with high interdependence among mem-
bers, and the investigation of  only three of  the 
five roles—leaves open some questions regarding 
generalizability.
Study 3
In Study 3, we replicated Study 2 with a number of  
changes designed to scrutinize the generalizability 
of  the effects found here to different conflict con-
texts. Specifically, we (a) replaced the work group 
setting with a group of  tenants living in the same 
house (in order to reduce the degree of  mutual 
interdependence between group members), (b) 
investigated all five third-party roles in a larger 
sample, and (c) investigated very mild and very 
ambiguous norm violations instead of  a more 
severe one as in Study 2. More specifically, the two 
tenants were in conflict either about (a) noise dis-
turbance, (b) how to use the shared garden area, or 
(c) parking spots in front of  the house. Participants 
then took their assigned role when the conflict 
came up in a meeting of  the housing community.
Sample
Participants were recruited via weekly invitations 
using a university-wide mailing list, incentivized 
by a raffle of  five €25 online-shopping vouchers, 
and took part using an online survey platform 
(SoSci Survey; https://www.soscisurvey.de). The 
sample consisted of  N = 230 participants (83% 
students, 70% women) between 18 and 61 years 
of  age (M = 26, SD = 8.19). Acknowledging that 
the context changes might reduce the effect size 
of  Hypothesis 3b, we aimed for a .80 power for 
an effect size half  as big as in Study 2 (f² = .15 / 
2 = .07). Thus, we set the threshold for data col-
lection at 176 participants. As planned, we 
stopped data collection 1 week after this thresh-
old was reached to include all participants that 
reacted to the last of  the weekly invitation emails.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were similar to 
those of  Study 2, except that we assessed the 
traits at the beginning of  the study (i.e., moral 
identity, observer sensitivity), randomly assigned 
all five roles using their goals, and used different 
conflict situations in our vignettes (see Appendix 
D in the supplemental material). Again, no par-
ticipants had to be excluded. The self-referent 
cognitions and emotions during the conflict ses-
sion were assessed in the same way as in the pre-
vious studies (all Cronbach’s α > .75).
Results and Discussion
Correlations and descriptive statistics can be 
found in Appendix E in the supplemental mate-
rial. The results conceptually replicate Study 2. In 
regard to Hypothesis 3a, taking a moral role (i.e., 
victim supporter or arbitrator) significantly 
increased the moral situational self-concept in 
comparison to taking an immoral role (i.e., per-
petrator supporter or escalator), with the neutral 
bystanders scoring in between, F(4, 225) = 51.25, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .48. The results are displayed in 
Table 7. In regard to Hypothesis 3b, we again 
found that moral internalization amplifies the 
effects of  moral role-taking on the moral situa-
tional self-concept: adding the Internalization × 
Role-Dummy interaction terms to the model pre-
dicting the moral situational self-concept lead to 
a significant increase in explained variance (R² = 
.04, p < .01). The results are displayed in Table 8. 
In contrast to Study 2, where this interaction was 
driven by the bystander role, it is driven by the 
escalator role in Study 3: in contrast to all other 
roles, the more escalators internalized moral 
notions, the less moral they felt in their role (Β = 
−0.41, p < .01). The fact that internalization 
seems to affect bystanders differently in Study 3 
in comparison to Study 2 reflects the change in 
context, as mentioned before. For people scoring 
high on internalization (+1 SD), taking any role 
other than the escalator role had significant posi-
tive effects on the predicted moral situational 
self-concept in a range from B = 2.79 for perpe-
trator supporters (p < .01) to B = 3.44 for arbi-
trators (p < .01). For people scoring low on 
internalization (−1 SD), the positive effects of  
taking any role other than the escalator role 
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persisted; however, the effects were reduced to a 
range from B = 1.41 for perpetrator supporters 
(p < .01) to B = 2.34 for victim supporters 
(p < .01).
This interaction pattern remained robust in 
additional analyses, including both a full model 
with moral symbolization as an additional mod-
erator (see Appendix E, Table 15, in the supple-
mental material) as well as models additionally 
controlling for observer sensitivity and its inter-
action terms. However, in contrast to Study 2, 
symbolization also amplified the positive effect 
of  moral role-taking on the moral situational self-
concept in Study 3 (∆R² = .02, p = .03), but only 
when ignoring internalization as a moderator. 
That is, the explanatory increment of  symboliza-
tion as an additional moderator over and above 
internalization was not significant in stepwise 
regression analyses (∆R² = .01, p = .20), whereas, 
the other way around, internalization as an addi-
tional moderator still explained incremental vari-
ance over and above symbolization and its 
interaction terms (∆R² = .03, p = .02). That is, 
Study 3 suggests that although moral symboliza-
tion may also amplify benefits in the moral situa-
tional self-concept due to moral role-taking, this 
effect is negligible once the much larger amplify-
ing effect of  moral internalization is taken into 
account. This underscores that moral internaliza-
tion, rather than moral symbolization, is the 
central moderator of  the positive effect of  moral 
role-taking on the moral situational self-concept.
General Discussion
In this article, we aimed at (a) individual-level 
mechanisms explaining interindividual differ-
ences in third-party reactions in interpersonal 
conflicts, and (b) the effects of  role-taking on the 
situational moral self-concept. Building on a defi-
nition of  social roles as the associations actors tie 
to social positions, we tested whether the choice 
of  roles can be uniquely predicted by personality 
traits reflecting the centrality of  a moral self-con-
cept and sensitivity for injustice (i.e., moral iden-
tity, observer sensitivity). In line with Hypotheses 
1 and 2, moral internalization and observer sensi-
tivity predicted the choice of  moral roles over 
and above other morality-related traits (i.e., hon-
esty-humility and agreeableness). However, moral 
symbolization did not show the hypothesized 
predictive effect.
Second, we tested whether taking a moral role 
leads to a more positive moral situational self-con-
cept than taking a neutral or immoral role—this 
follows from the argument that role-taking is inter-
twined with the situational self-concept. Results 
were consistent with this hypothesis in two studies 
using both correlational and experimental designs: 
participants who selected (Study 1) or were assigned 
Table 7. Mean scores, standard deviations, and univariate analyses of variance for facets of the situational self-
concept as a function of role in Study 3.
Role Moral Self-esteem Power Meaning Expression
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Victim supporter 4.62a 0.76 4.93a 0.74 4.32a 0.95 4.28ab 0.75 4.51a 0.91
Arbitrator 4.57a 0.95 4.97a 0.83 4.04ab 0.83 4.35a 1.02 4.52a 0.94
Bystander 4.31ab 1.04 4.57a 0.93 3.38c 1.14 3.72b 1.17 4.50a 0.86
Perpetrator supporter 3.90b 1.06 4.43a 1.02 3.70bc 0.86 3.75b 1.10 4.15a 1.07
Escalator 1.96c 1.23 2.50b 1.16 3.55bc 1.10 2.43c 1.04 2.79b 1.22
ANOVA
(F), ηp²
(51.25*), .48 (51.23*), .48 (6.50*), .11 (24.35*), .30 (24.01*), .30
Note. N = 230, except for power, N = 222. All scales range from 1 to 6. Superscript letters indicate homogeneous subgroups 
following the Tukey-HSD (honest significant difference) procedure.
*p < .05.
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to (Studies 2 and 3) a moral role experienced them-
selves as more moral persons during the conflict in 
comparison to participants in neutral or immoral 
roles.
In addition, we investigated a potential moti-
vational mechanism underlying the predictive 
effect of  moral internalization for taking moral 
roles. We argued that taking a moral role fosters 
the moral situational self-concept. What follows 
from this argument is that the effect of  taking a 
moral role on self-referent moral cognitions and 
emotions should be particularly pronounced 
among “high internalizers” (i.e., people with high 
values on moral internalization), but not among 
“high symbolizers” (i.e., people with high values 
on moral symbolization), because only moral 
internalization reflects the centrality of  being 
moral for one’s self-concept. This hypothesis (3b) 
was tested in all three studies. While the effect did 
not occur in Study 1 (in which role-taking was 
self-selected and, thus, quasi-experimental), the 
results of  the more rigid tests in Studies 2 and 3 
(in which role-taking was randomly assigned) 
were in line with this hypothesis: people with rela-
tively high values on moral internalization (but 
not those with relatively high values on moral 
symbolization) felt even more moral after taking 
moral roles in conflicts.
The difference in results in Study 1 needs to 
be discussed. The quasi-experimental design of  
Study 1 made it more difficult to rigidly test the 
hypothesized moderation effect, because inter-
nalization and role-taking were confounded. One 
potential alternative explanation of  the null effect 
regarding Hypothesis 3b in Study 1 caused by the 
quasi-experimental design lies in a post hoc legiti-
mization of  a bystander role choice in Study 1: 
actors scoring high on moral internalization were 
arguably more prone to justify their inactive role 
choice post hoc by reporting a more moral situa-
tional self-concept. That could be the reason why 
one obtains similar positive regression coeffi-
cients of  internalization on the moral situational 
self-concept in all roles (see Step 2, Table 4). In 
Table 8. Hierarchical regression analysis summary for role-taking and moral internalization predicting 
participants’ moral situational self-concept in Study 3.
Step and predictor variable B SE B R² ∆R²
Step 1: .48*  
 Intercept 2.00 0.16  
 Arbitrator (dummy) 2.57* 0.22  
 Victim supporter (dummy) 2.63* 0.23  
 Bystander (dummy) 2.32* 0.22  
 Perpetrator supporter (dummy) 1.92* 0.22  
 Internalization 0.07 0.07  
Step 2: .52* .04*
 Intercept 1.81 0.16  
 Arbitrator (dummy) 2.69* 0.22  
 Victim supporter (dummy) 2.81* 0.22  
 Bystander (dummy) 2.49* 0.21  
 Perpetrator supporter (dummy) 2.10* 0.22  
 Internalization −0.41* 0.14  
 Arbitrator x Internalization 0.75* 0.22  
 Victim Supporter x Internalization 0.47* 0.21  
 Bystander x Internalization 0.62* 0.20  
 Perpetrator Supporter x Internalization 0.69* 0.21  
Note. N = 230. Reference category for the role dummies = escalator. Internalization was z-standardized.
*p < .05.
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Studies 2 and 3, post hoc justifications are not 
necessary because roles were assigned, not 
selected. This might have been the decisive factor 
to reveal an amplifying effect of  internalization 
on the moral situational self-concept boost after 
moral role-taking (see Step 2, Table 6).
In conclusion, the results lend support to our 
theoretical argument that moral role-taking in 
interpersonal conflicts is related to a process of  
moral self-regulation, rather than, for example, 
impression management concerns. In sum, when 
explaining third-party reactions, the results high-
light the importance of  how these reactions feed-
back on the actors’ moral self-concept during the 
conflict, and how interindividual differences 
moderate this feedback, reinforcing the reaction 
in this way.
Limitations
The present research faced four methodological 
challenges. First, demand effects are relevant 
because participants might have taken moral roles 
more often or reported more positive self-refer-
ent cognitions and emotions after moral role-
taking because they might have inferred that this 
were the effects we were looking for (e.g., from 
the role labels). We tried to minimize such arti-
facts by capturing the reactions in Study 1 in open 
format first, avoiding the labels “victim” and 
“perpetrator” in general, and by avoiding any role 
labels in Study 2 or 3 (e.g., we used a schematic 
description of  the various roles in Study 2; see 
Figure 2). Of  course, we cannot rule out that par-
ticipants guessed our hypotheses despite these 
demand-reducing strategies.
Second, the samples in all three studies were 
dominated by students, while the second sample 
consisted of  first-year psychology students only. 
This raises the question of  generalizability. 
Especially in regard to interpersonal conflict 
behavior, effects might differ between psychol-
ogy students and the general population. For 
example, compared to the general population, 
psychology students might have a stronger pref-
erence for moral roles. However, role choice was 
only self-selected in Study 1, and the sample of  
Study 1 also comprised a substantial amount of  
students of  other departments, as well as nonstu-
dents (30%). In Studies 2 and 3, roles were ran-
domly assigned.
Third, the sample size of  Study 2 was rela-
tively small. This raises issues of  statistical power 
and the question of  reliability. However, a false 
positive in regard to the central result (i.e., the 
interaction of  moral role-taking and moral inter-
nalization on the moral situational self-concept) 
seems to be quite implausible, taking the consist-
ency of  the overall data pattern into account (see 
Table 6). Furthermore, the results were conceptu-
ally replicated in Study 3.
Fourth, we investigated only two (i.e., work 
groups and house communities) out of  all possi-
ble conflict contexts, and results might differ in 
other contexts (e.g., families, circles of  friends, or 
groups of  complete strangers). For example, in 
close and durable groups like families, the history 
of  the group and personal relations might be so 
crucially decisive for third-party reactions that 
they could overshadow the mechanisms pre-
sented here. On the other hand, the structural 
positions of  conflicts and the roles tied to them 
do not differ between contexts, and in so far, the 
line of  thought presented here should be general-
izable. However, replications in other contexts 
are desirable.
Outlook
In the present studies, we investigated how the 
moral value of  roles in conflicts affects the situ-
ational self-concept. It is important to note that 
contextual factors can influence the moral value 
of  a role in a specific conflict. However, a role-
theoretical framework is also useful when outlin-
ing contextual factors. For example, personal 
relations can additionally influence the moral 
value of  roles in a specific situation. In role-theo-
retical terms, the existence of  personal relations 
creates intraindividual interrole conflicts: if  the 
perpetrator in a conflict is also my friend, I am 
torn between the loyalty principle tied to my 
friend role and my moral evaluation of  the perpe-
trator supporter role. The same logic applies to 
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categorical relations such as group memberships. 
However, to investigate our hypotheses with a 
basic design first, we looked at third-party role-
taking in a common ingroup setting (i.e., third 
party and others are members of  the same 
group), with no further information about per-
sonal relations. Future research could fill this gap 
by systematically varying personal and categorical 
relations of  the third party and the focal conflict 
actors, or the whole group.
Furthermore, conflicts take place in a variety 
of  groups (e.g., in working teams, house commu-
nities, or families), and group characteristics 
moderate the moral value of  roles. First and fore-
most, the degree of  interdependence among 
members (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) is noteworthy: 
in groups with high interdependence, destructive 
conflicts create more fallout for everyone, and 
thus, the more moral it becomes to solve them 
instead of  staying passive or even escalating 
them. In role-theoretical terms, the degree of  
interdependence is a system-level factor that 
amplifies the importance of  all roles in that sys-
tem. The design of  Study 3 was based on this 
idea, and the results underscore this reasoning. 
However, future research should investigate the 
degree of  interdependence among members and 
other group characteristics more comprehen-
sively. Summing up, contextual factors addition-
ally influence the moral value of  a role in a 
specific situation, and their effects can be inte-
grated in a role-theoretical framework in future 
work.
Conclusion
The present studies demonstrate how a role-the-
oretical approach can help to analyze the social 
structure of  conflicts, and to understand the 
intraindividual processes deciding how third par-
ties engage with and are affected by role-taking in 
conflicts. In sum, the results illustrate that stable 
features of  third-party actors’ self-concepts, such 
as moral internalization, affect role-taking in con-
flicts, and that role-taking reflects back on more 
malleable manifestations of  the self, that is, the 
moral situational self-concept. In conclusion, the 
studies suggest that third-party reactions to con-
flicts are at least partly driven by moral self-regu-
lation, that is, that third parties react in certain 
ways in order to experience themselves as moral 
persons. In contrast, we did not find any support 
for moral impression management in our 
studies.
Looking forward, research following these 
and similar directions will create stepping stones 
on the road to a comprehensive role-theoretical 
understanding of  third-party behavior in inter-
personal conflicts. Besides paving the way for 
role-theoretical research in other domains (e.g., 
negotiations, solutions to social dilemmas, etc.), 
this understanding will help developing effective 
and efficient interventions (i.e., coaching ses-
sions, training programs) aimed at preventing sit-
uations like the one described at the beginning of  
this article (i.e., Bob and Rob’s conflict over tak-
ing credit for ideas), or at least at helping third 
parties to deal with them efficiently.
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Notes
1. The escalator role was not included in designs of  
Study 1 and Study 2, because it is—similar to the 
perpetrator supporter role, but to an even stronger 
extent—a role with a close-to-zero choice prob-
ability in a stripped down experimental vignette 
with no information on context factors (e.g., rela-
tionships to victim or perpetrator, status in the 
work team, monetary incentives, etc.).
2. We also ran all tests with noncorrected labels, to 
check if  this correction of  mislabeling changed 
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any results. No differences emerged between the 
two samples.
3. If  the hypothesized pattern of  interactions had 
emerged, it would have been necessary to further 
scrutinize the effect by also running the models 
including moral internalization and symboliza-
tion as moderators of  moral role-taking effects 
four more times, one for each of  the other four 
assessed facets of  the situational self-concept. 
Although the hypothesized effect was not found 
in Study 1, we still ran these models. No inter-
action effects of  moral role-taking and internali-
zation or symbolization emerged regarding the 
other four facets.
4. To test the interaction of  internalization and role-
taking over and above effects of  symbolization 
and its interaction with role-taking, we also ran a 
full model (see Appendix C, Table 13, in the sup-
plemental material), yielding the same pattern of  
results. Also note that the results are unaffected 
by including observer sensitivity and its interac-
tion terms into the model. To even further scru-
tinize the hypothesized effect, we ran the model 
including moral internalization as a moderator of  
moral role-taking effects four more times, one for 
each of  the other four facets of  the situational 
self-concept experienced in the conflict situation. 
Although one could expect similar patterns at 
least for expression of  identity (∆R² = .09, p = 
.06) and for meaningfulness of  behavior (∆R² = 
.08, p = .06), no further significant moderating 
effects were found.
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